November12
Bill Ackman, CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management, was on Charlie Rose. This interview explained a lot for me! Here’s my rough summary…

Hedge funds didn’t become a real industry until about 7 years ago. Right now, most are down 20-30% and Ackman contributes this to short selling being made illegal in September. This was something that was perfectly legal for many years and it has caused hedge funds to lose tremendous amounts of money.
A hedge fund is an investment partnership. The difference between a hedge fund and a mutual fund is that the manager of a hedge fund is compensated largely based on performance. The manager gets 20% of the profits and usually has a very large investment alongside his investors. Also, a fee of 1-2% is charged for assets managed. They are more expensive than mutual funds and they aren’t regulated because the number of investors are limited and have to be accredited (they have to meet a certain net worth standard).
“Going long” means making an investment - buying a stock on the exchange - you make money if the stock goes up. “Going short” is borrowing a stock and selling it on the hope that you can buy it back at a lower price. Investors make money if the stock goes down.
The problem with the government shutting down the short selling for a while was that the government changed the rules of the game with no warning. If the government had said, “we are going to phase out short selling over a period of time” it wouldn’t have been so disastrous for an industry. But if you have investors who are committed to their partners to stay balanced - they don’t want to be more than a certain amount long vs. the amount they are short - you lose the ability to insure yourself. Short selling is a way to protect yourself from the market going down. By taking away that very important tool, managers got imbalanced and were forced to sell their long positions. Hedge fund investors are not large short sellers shorting stocks. Most short selling is done through derivatives. The rest is done through credit default swap.
You can short a stock and bet that a stock will decline in value. Another way to make a similar bet is to buy an insurance policy on a company defaulting. That insurance policy is called a credit default swap and it trades on the over-the-counter market. You can call up Morgan Stanley and they will make you a price on the probability of GE, for instance, defaulting. That probability has been perceived to be very low over a long period of time so the cost of the insurance is low. But if you had the view that GE’s credit would deteriorate, you could buy that insurance policy and sell it at a later date. Think about being able to sell the insurance policy on your home. When you first buy it, the cost is low. But if a brush fire occurred in your neighborhood, your insurance policy would become more valuable. You’d be able to sell it for much more than what you bought it for. Credit default swaps are a way to hedge, or make a bet, on a company’s credit worthiness - either to the positive or to the negative.
The Credit Swap Market can be a very profitable business because the major banks have not taken a side - they don’t bet against or in favor of a particular company’s credit but they acted as an intermediary. It is an over-the-counter market rather than a market on an exchange, so the spread between the price to buy a contract and the price to sell a contract was quite wide. Dealers made very wide profits by acting in the middle. It’s a very efficient way to make a bet.
He first started noticing something fishy going on through MBIA, a bond insurer. MBIA started out in a very low risk business. But as markets become more competitive, bond insurers are forced to take on more risks to keep their share holders happy. In the early ’90s, most of the bond markets went public. They had demands from their share holders and management was compensated with options, so they started looking for other avenues for profit. They had a AAA rating so Wall Street suggested they guarantee corporate risk, like mortgages, and so they entered a market they knew less well. They are very leveraged companies.
What struck Ackman when he first opened the annual report of one of these companies was that it had a triple A rating but over 100 to 1 in leverage and that didn’t compute because 30 or 40 to 1 is high.
He says the criticism of the ratings agencies is deserved. They perform what is almost a regulatory function. They determine the credit worthiness of a bond and so they got an almost sovereign like status but they were for-profit entities. The for-profit nature of what is a quasi-regulatory body pushed them for production. Trying to meet next quarter’s earnings can cause someone to sign off on a rating that wasn’t deserved. You say, “yes it’s triple A” even though there are a few bad mortgages thrown into the mix, you get paid a $600,000 fee. You say no, you don’t make any money.
Regulators around the world deferred to the rating agencies. This allowed for securities that shouldn’t have been sold to spread around the world.
The average mutual fund has done much worse than the average hedge fund. People tend to demonize hedge funds because they managers are so well compensated. The focus should be less on the manager than who they manage money for. Investors are the Carenegie Hall’s of the world, the St. Luke’s Hospitals, the state pension funds, etc. The SEC did a good job of destroying opportunistic capital by putting on a short selling ban without notice. It caused a loss of confidence in the U.S. securities market. The reason you invest in the U.S. markets rather than in foreign markets is because you have confidence that the rules won’t be changed, but they were changed. People that would normally be jumping in to take advantage of what Buffett calls the best opportunity to invest in his life time is that they can’t - they are on the defense because they are getting redemptions.
Credit default swaps have historically been largely unregulated and Ackman thinks they should be regulated. It’s a combination of the credit default swaps and the rating agencies that got us into trouble. The institutions that have created the most systemic risk are AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBIA, etc. They all had triple A ratings. Unlike the other participants in the market, they got a free pass. They didn’t have to post collateral. Now that they’ve been downgraded, they have to post collateral. It’s like someone writing hurricane insurance and when the hurricane hits, they don’t have the money.
We have a system where it is not illegal to run out of money. We can reorganize companies - the bankruptcy system. In the case of Freddie and Fannie, it’s called conservativeship. Paulson did the right thing by putting them into conservativeship, but he stopped there. He didn’t reorganize them. They became government run companies no longer traded on the exchange. The equity holders and option plans for managers have been wiped out and they have too much debt.
What the government should have done was combine Fannie and Freddie, because they perform the same function, and make them as efficient as possible. Take the 1.6 trillion of debt and convert 20% of it into equity so you have raised 320 billion dollars. That way they could re-emerge as listed companies on the stock exchange and they could go back to writing business as strong, well-capitalized companies. Frannie and Freddie have all the money they need. The problem is too much is debt, too little is equity. You just need to restore the balance.
Ackman put together a presentation for Paulson and his plan was seriously considered, but they ultimately opted to go with something else.
Ackman thinks the $700 billion dollars has so far been spent well. $250 billion going into the banks is a very important first step. Also, the cost of funding for businesses has come down which is a positive. But he is concerned about GM. The way to solve the problem is not to lend more money to GM. GM should reorganize - they should do a pre-packaged bankruptcy. The equity holders have been largely wiped out already. You could buy all of GM at $2 billion and you would be over-paying. The debt needs to be reduced to a level the company can support and the debt holders in exchange for giving up their debt claim will end up owning the business. You want a GM that can compete. You don’t want to lend government tax payer money to an insolvent company so that they can pay interest to the people who lent the money five years ago. That’s not a solution to the problem. The government money would be better spent to retrain employees for other jobs, infrastructure, etc.
The bankruptcy word scares people, but it’s simply another system.
Ackman thinks Lehman could have been saved but the management loved the institution too much to take the money on terms they thought was unfair and they had no idea what it would cost the institution. There was a South Korean buyer who might have been in place for a while. And Buffett made a proposal that was rejected.
Ackman agrees that investment banks as we have known them are gone forever. They essentially became hedge funds because they were so highly leveraged.
He’s also optimistic about the new administration. Having a leader who can inspire the people is huge because the markets are driven by confidence. We have a solvent government and we borrow on our own currency.